Between the Thanksgiving holiday (my first try at making turducken was a qualified success, but I was pretty satisfied with my virgin attempt) and coming down with what was probably the flu, I’ve been absent from the blog this last week. In that time, Allan, Eugenia, Keith, and Nina have admirably held down the fort, particularly with the flurry of presidential appointment news this week. But as the founder of this site, though by no means the pre-eminent editorial voice, I felt I should chime in with a few general thoughts on the transition and AAPI political appointments in particular.

The discussion below reflects information generally available to anyone who makes an effort to be active in Asian American & Pacific Islander issues and activism and has been following the Obama transition and campaign closely; in other words, you don’t need special access to get the underlying facts. I emphasize this point mainly to underscore the need for people to do their homework. Uninformed arguments don’t advance discourse, nor do they leave the participants or audience any better off.

Obviously, the big news today for both AAPIs and the transition in general is the nomination of General Eric Shinseki for Secretary of Veterans Affairs. This department was elevated to cabinet level by Congress in 1988, beginning with the H.W. Bush Administration. In recent years with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this department has gained increasing importance. Under George W. Bush, this was yet another department that became notorious for incompetence, with the discovery of shockingly poor conditions at Walter Reed, our nation’s supposedly pre-eminent veterans hospital (and hospital to many government leaders). It’s now the second largest cabinet department, responsible for managing our enormous VA medical system, which is actually one example of how national health care might work. With the recently passed new GI Bill, VA will oversee the administration of all sorts of services and benefits.

General Shinseki has had an amazing career, having served and been wounded in Vietnam, commanded US and NATO forces in Europe, with the last major move in his career appointment as Army Chief of Staff by President Clinton in 1999. I was interning for the Organization of Chinese Americans in DC when he was nominated and confirmed, and I remember one of my assignments was drafting a letter from OCA commending the nomination. I was extremely happy with the choice at the time, as Shinseki was the first Asian American four star general and the first AAPI to head up the US Army.

I was also very upset to learn of Shinseki’s marginalization after he testified before Congress to the need for hundreds of thousands of US troops to effectively stabilize Iraq after a proposed invasion. I was doubly upset by his rough treatment at the hands of Sec. Rumsfeld, despite Shinseki being arguably one of the first to espouse views favored by Rumsfeld on modernizing the Army for less traditional battlefield engagements and smaller, more mobile, and flexible units geared towards urban combat and insurgencies (and some have argued that Rumsfeld basically copied many of Shinseki’s proposals). Shinseki’s personal military philosophy was definitely sympathetic to Rumsfeld’s views on a more modern, flexible, and technologically advanced fighting force, yet he was punished when he did not tow the line on every position.

Though Shinseki tends towards the apolitical, declining to comment publicly on most political controversies (the testimony to the US Senate on Iraq troop levels was a notable exception - and much praise from his fellow officers noted how bold it was for Shinseki to publicly voice disagreement), he also expressed concerns about the strains of current military demands on soldiers and their families. He’s a great choice. (For those who wondered why he wasn’t pushed more for Secretary of Defense, Shinseki’s ineligible. You have to be out of the military for ten years to serve as Secretary of Defense as part of the rules to protect civilian leadership of the military.)

All of the above helps further clarify Sen. Obama’s approach to picking people for his administration. The number one criteria appears to be competence. In particular, Obama seems to want to avoid the type of politically motivated appointments that characterized the Bush Administration, where those who were either loyalists of the campaign or part of Bush’s inner circle of friends, business partners, and other cronies, were given priority and usually performed poorly.

What this has meant so far is a basic unwillingness to simply “reward” supporters with plum appointments or “punish” opponents by exclusion. It’s also meant picking people with a proven record of success in some area, which has led to some grumbles about the lack of “change” because of the lack of a full break with the past. Shinseki has enormous administrative experience as a commanding officer involved in operations, support, and logistics, which is critical for managing the sprawling VA bureaucracy, not to mention his reputation for commanding loyalty and affection from his troops.

This brings me to the subject of Obama’s supposed favoring of Clinton “retreads.” First, most people leveling this criticism seem to miss the difference between a Clinton Administration era official and a Clintonista. There are very few well-respected and experienced leaders on the Democratic side on the national level that didn’t serve in some capacity in the Clinton Administration. Remember, Clinton was the only Democratic president we had in the last 28 years, so it’d be tough to find someone with executive branch experience who didn’t get it under Clinton.

That doesn’t even begin to touch the numerous differences between being a top adviser, political ally, or central part of an administration’s team, versus the thousands of other substantive policy-making and administrative positions that are primarily about executing policy, being an effective manager, or just doing necessary grunt work. There are also fairly high-ranking careerists that serve because of their expertise rather than political connections.

Many of Obama’s picks have Clinton-related items on their resumes, but are hardly Clintonistas. They include people who were brought in because of talent and/or political allies - Gore friend and former FCC Chair Reed Hundt is a good example here, as is the apolitical Shinseki himself, Clintonistas that broke very publicly and early with the Clinton camp (at great personal risk to their careers) - former Clinton Deputy AG Eric Holder, former Clinton National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, and former Clinton Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice are notable examples, those who didn’t necessarily “break” with Clinton rather than go their own direction, such as Bill Richardson, and those who were Clinton contemporaries but had their own center of gravity, such as Tom Daschle.

Now, I’m pretty opposed to the notion that change of policy and direction can only come about with complete change in personnel, so I offer the above not so much as a rebuttal to the point that there’s been no change in personnel, but that this criticism has often been ham-handed. Some versions I’ve seen have even go so far as to argue that those who served in career civil service positions during the Clinton Administration are now somehow “tainted” purely by association, even if they were primarily attorneys for DOJ or something similar.

Nor are all Clinton “loyalists” created equal. I would think that most progressives would agree that there was a world of difference between the political worldviews of Robert Reich and Robert Rubin. The Treasury team itself offers an instructive example. The Clinton economic team’s most prominent members included at some point Robert Rubin, Larry Summers, Gene Sperling, Brad DeLong, and Paul Krugman. All of those, with the exception of Krugman, typically get lumped together, when the reality of behind the scenes economic policy making was quite different. Summers is a great example of this - some have blamed Summers for inaction on or opposing regulation on financial instruments and derivatives, for example - but there is also a lot of internal evidence of Summers advocating a number of more activist/interventionist measures under Rubin that were ultimately not followed. This is why former Treasury officials have often been described as Rubin versus Summers proteges.

DeLong is also known as a key part of the Clinton Treasury team, yet his views are quite different from the usual “Rubinomics” (itself often misrepresented). For example, in the very early stages of the credit crisis, DeLong agreed generally with Krugman’s call to nationalize, rather than bailout, the big financial institutions, following the examples of Switzerland, Great Britain, Germany, and Sweden. DeLong also supported Obama early. Geithner, also a former Clinton Treasury official, worked primarily on international markets and dealt with financial crises in Asia during the Asian flu and with rebuilding Brazil’s economy and played little direct role in financial markets regulation here in the US at that time. When he went to the New York Fed in late 2003 (by which time most of the foundations of the economic crisis were firmly in place), he started calling immediately for more regulation.

Clinton’s economic team is also a great example of how leadership makes a difference. No matter the positions or inclinations of individual Administration members, decisions are ultimately made at the top. Even those decisions that are not directly made at the top are heavily influenced by the tone and direction set by the President. How closely a subordinate will hew to the explicit and implicit directions of the President really depends on how strong and effective a leader the President is. For example, a president can make it clear that he prefers his Treasury Secretary’s position to his Chief of Council of Economic Advisers. Under Clinton, Rubin’s views clearly predominated over Joseph Stiglitz, who served as Chief of CEA. Under Bush, however, Snow was far less prominent than Glenn Hubbard at CEA, etc. Likewise, Christie Todd Whitman was frequently overridden at EPA. Whether you believe Obama can make Geithner or Gates an effective part of the Administration depends on your faith in his leadership abilities and style. Since Obama has over forty days before he is actually President, right now, all we can do is speculate.

Right now, my sense is that Obama intends to be very clear on his agenda and has picked people he believes have the experience and ability to enact that agenda. I think it’s fairly clear that on the War in Iraq and the economy, he’s hoping to use people trusted by potential opponents to deliver the strong medicine. Having Bush-era officials play a big part in presiding over the end of the War in Iraq is a fantastic strategy to get buy-in from all sides and prevent Republicans from using it as a campaign issue, like Nixon going to China or Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams co-leading Northern Ireland.

Some have said that Obama didn’t have to just pick those with Clinton Administration experience, but could be picking more Congressional staff. First, it’s not altogether clear what Congressional staff experience brings to the management of an executive branch department. And if purists want to dig, a lot of veteran Congressional staff have worked in the Clinton Administration as well. Also, Obama has picked a lot of Congressional staffers, but for less visible posts. These include Pete Rouse and Chris Lu in his White House staff and Melody Barnes for Domestic Policy Council. Notice how these positions are the ones most directly responsible for formulating and shepherding White House policy - positions where Congressional experience is important?

I think the above illustrates the tendency to ignore or discount appointments to less well-known positions. Obama got a lot of grief on the lack of change in his economic team, despite his naming of Christina Romer - a really cool and groundbreaking economist with highly relevant expertise in depression economics - as Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, which is a key economic policy body and Austan Goolsbee as member of the CEA and Chief Economist of the newly created Economic Recovery Advisory Board. He also got virtually no attention for nominating Melody Barnes or Lisa Brown of the progressive American Constitution Society to be Staff Secretary. Those who did notice have lauded these two as great “change” picks, though Lisa Brown was Al Gore’s counsel and Melody Barnes worked for years for Sen. Ted Kennedy, a liberal lion, but a Washington institution to be sure.

This brings us finally to the question of AAPI appointments. Allan has done an admirable job of responding to a lot of the comments we’ve been receiving on the subject, particularly at this earlier post on Chris Lu.

First, a lot of commenters seem to be unaware that there already are coordinated efforts underway within the Asian American & Pacific Islander community to work with the transition team on AAPI appointments. As you may have noticed from the last few posts, Parag Mehta, former Director of Training and Director of External Communications for the DNC (and a fellow Central Texan), recently joined the Obama Transition Team to liaise with various constituencies, including AAPIs. Anyone who knows Parag and his work knows of his passion for the AAPI community. Groups including the National Council of Asian Pacific Americans (an umbrella group for over a dozen national AAPI organizations, including APIA Vote, NAPABA, OCA, NAKASEC, etc.), the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, and Asian Pacific Americans for Progress have already been advocating on behalf of AAPI appointees at every level of the Administration. AAPI leaders and activists have been invited to numerous conference calls and discussions with the transition team on AAPI appointments.

In fact, at the recent National Asian Pacific American Bar Association convention, Karen Narasaki of the Asian American Justice Center noted how unlike past transitions, where one or two “gatekeepers” handled appointments from various communities, the Obama transition has officially enlisted the help of a group of “progressive organizations,” including AAPI organizations on transition matters. As Sepia Mutiny pointed out, this transition has been one of the most transparent and accessible in history with the online and other access offered by the Obama team. Just recently, we also learned that all meetings with outside groups will be streamed online and all documents submitted by such groups will also be posted online.

I’m glad we have folks who are energized to advocate for AAPIs, but my first piece of advice for those that are itching to help is to do your homework and find out what efforts are already under way and how you can help. As you probably know, most AAPI groups have limited funding, so volunteers are probably more than welcome. When Allan encouraged folks to “wait and see,” I’m sure he was not advocating a do nothing approach, but to reserve judgment until we see how things play out. We definitely encourage everyone to get involved. As my political mentor used to say, “If you think someone really ought to do something, that that someone is you!” Anyone can complain, but it takes a real activist to do something about it.

That’s also why “doing your homework” is so important. If you’re not researching, communicating, and working on these issues, do so before you speak. How many people knew Shinseki was on the short list for VA Secretary? Virtually no one - he didn’t appear on any short list that I saw, even though another AAPI, Tammy Duckworth, did. How many people claimed as recently as yesterday that there would be no AAPI cabinet appointment? Though the experience with the transition has been short, I think there’s been enough evidence that Obama’s approach is not only disciplined, but subtle.

On a related note, I’d also recommend a quick civics review about the structure of the Executive Branch. A lot of commenters seem fixated on high profile cabinet positions to the exclusion of other key posts. Sure, cabinet secretaries get top billing during these times, but the savvy and experienced know that real power has little to do with titles. Secretaries of Commerce don’t usually get much attention, but Obama’s nomination of a high profile personality (Bill Richardson) to that position, along with the rumored role that Commerce will take in Obama’s green economy initiative may change that.

The most powerful positions are usually the least understood. Some have discounted Chris Lu’s appointment because they’re unfamiliar with the title and because the Cabinet Secretary position apparently doesn’t exist under Bush. Yet new titles are most often created to give a President’s inner circle flexibility and access; Karl Rove initially had a newly created title under Bush, yet few would doubt his influence. There are numerous amorphous “Special Adviser” titles that don’t have specific, well-known job descriptions, yet these are among the most powerful people in America. Chris is someone who has been one of Obama’s closest advisers for years; it’s hard to imagine he would somehow have more influence in another part of DC in a different building for a particular department instead of having the ear of the President and a White House office. Pete Rouse will also have enormous access - his position is equivalent to that of Josh Lyman’s in the West Wing. I can’t think of another White House where two members of the President’s inner circle were Asian American; these are the AAPIs Obama will see virtually every day.

It’s also hard to use a past president as a gauge of how Obama will conduct policy discussions. Many have commented on Shinseki’s visible role as a dissenting voice on the Iraq War planning. Now, strictly speaking, VA is a very different part of the military. However, it’s likely Sen. Obama will be including Shinseki in discussions on national security policy, just like he ended up putting big economic names in several different agencies so he could rely on all of their advice. Goolsbee, Volcker, Summers, and Geithner all bring some very different things to the table in terms of views, experience, age, etc. (though they do agree on things, too), so Obama brought them all on board. Goolsbee doesn’t have the big title now, but I have little doubt he’ll be a major player. Plus, there are political advantages to choosing the big name up front and grooming the newcomers to replace them. Recall that Clinton’s first Treasury Secretary was the much better known Lloyd Bentsen, who was only later replaced by Rubin. And Summers was pretty unknown to the general public until he was groomed to replace Rubin. Watch the AAPIs appointed as deputy and assistant secretaries, general counsels, special counsels, special advisers in various departments, etc. That will be a big clue as to the potential for future higher profile AAPI appointments.

Much of the business of government is done by people who rarely see the spotlight. For example, the Solicitor General, the government’s top trial lawyer, is an incredibly important position that can have an enormous impact on how policy is shaped by the courts; yet, I’ve seen little agitation for Preeta Bansal outside of the AAPI advocacy groups. We ignore less high profile positions at the cost of losing key influence and missing important opportunities. To repeat a common theme of the presidential campaign, tactical victories are less important than strategic ones.

Focusing exclusively on AAPI appointments also can detract from larger policy change efforts. Restoring the White House Commission on Asian Pacific American affairs, rendered a hollow shell by Bush, improving policy for AAPIs in labor, health and human services, etc., and more are critical goals that cannot be achieved through the efforts of AAPI appointments alone. AAPIs should endeavor to move beyond crass patronage and demonstrate our political sophistication at every level.

This last point brings me to one of the more disturbing notes I’ve heard in some of the appointment discussion. Some seem determined to cast appointments as a case of AAPIs versus African Americans versus Latinos (and sometimes Jews). The last thing we need to be doing is playing into the hands of racists by allowing a divide-and-conquer strategy. Though it’s a cliche, I think it’s important to emphasize that we don’t get anywhere as a community fighting with others over the same tiny slice of the pie; instead, it’s to all of our benefit to work together to others to expand opportunities for everyone.

If you’re unhappy with the supposed lack of support provided by other communities for AAPIs, then you should ask yourself what have you done to build bridges and coalitions? What have you done to improve relationships between our community and others? None of this is to say that we bear full responsibility for engaging other communities or that members of other communities are blameless for failing to do so, but in the end, progress can only be made when we take responsibility. The best way to marginalize the worst elements of divisiveness in other communities is to repudiate those in our communities and to discredit their views through our work.

On this front, here’s my step. Sen. Obama’s nomination of Eric Holder for Attorney General seemed to pass without any comment on the fact that Holder would be the first African American to be confirmed for the post (he served as acting AG for a brief period at the beginning of Bush’s first term). Apparently electing Sen. Obama has led some to believe that we no longer need to applaud the breaking of barriers in government generally. On the contrary, I feel that it’s all the more important to emphasize the need for continued progress and that the election of Sen. Obama did not in itself obliterate discrimination with one stroke. Progress is about breaking barriers for everyone, and AAPIs should recognize that just as injustice anywhere is injustice everywhere, a victory for anyone is a victory for all.